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I. INTRODUCTION
A. FOCUS OF THE STUDY
This study will research the advantages and disadvantages
associated with the consolidation of the Helicopter Anti-
submarine (HS) and Helicopter Anti-submarine (Light) (HSL)
missions and communities. This paper also propose four
combined squadron organizations and describes the advantages
and disadvantages of each new structure. The data for this
study was gathered by interviewing current Commanding
Officers (CO's) of the HS and HSL squadrons.
B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
After forty years of independent helicop* r and mission
development, the HS and HSL communities are currently flying
a similar helicopter, the Sikorsky H-60. The HSL version,
the SH-60B, was introduced to the fleet in 1984 while the HS
version, the SH-60F, began operational flights in 1989. A
common airframe and core mission helicopter, the SH-60R, is
proposed to begin operation in 2001. With the introduction
of the common core aircraft will come the consolidation of
the HS and HSL Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS's). A
natural progression in this evolution may be the uniting of
these helicopter communities.
The general military downsizing and the decreasing
defense budget requires today's naval organizations to do
1
more with less. In this current climate of declining
military budgets and manpower reductions many people ask
whether naval aviation can afford to maintain two separate
ASW helicopter communities and their two supporting infra-
structures. Because of the economic conditions, there is a
search for a better way to do business. Consolidation of the
HS and HSL communities may be a better way of doing
business
.
Recently the question of consolidation has been raised
more frequently. CAPT George Galdorisi, in his article,
"Strike Force Air Power For The Twenty-First Century,
"
(1991) proposed a new helicopter squadron structure that
includes the HS, HSL, and HC (Helicopter Combat Vertical
Replenishment) communities. Since then many point papers
supporting or rejecting the idea of consolidation have been
written. RADM F. Dirren's article, "Focus on the future:
20/20 Vision," (1994) states the HS and HSL helicopter
communities are currently formulating their future
development strategies. The Helicopter Type Wing Commanders
have been tasked to look at the HS and HSL communities and
address the issues surrounding consolidation. Their findings
are summarized in a "Vision 2005" brief which was presented
to the seven Helicopter Flag Officers.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
Little formal literature is available on the consoli-
dation of the HS and HSL communities but it has been the
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subject of many unpublished point papers. Most of these
papers are written by Navy members who have experience in
either one or both communities, and typically, their focus
reflects community bias. Few of these papers view the two
communities as organizations that are shaped and influenced
by external and internal constraints just like other
standard organizations. The term organization is defined as
"a formal association of people that have been created for
the purpose of accomplishing collective goals on a relative
continuous basis" (Connor, 1984, pp.4). Using this
definition the HS and HSL squadrons qualify as organizations
and any effort to redesign them should be governed by the
same logic utilized when redesigning other type
organizations.
In Patrick E. Conner's module, "Organization Structure
and Design," (1984) he defines what an organization is and
how its design is dependant upon the environment it operates
in, the technology it utilizes, and the work force available
to it. These constraints shape the design of organizations
and must be considered before attempting to redesign a
current structure. In Chapter III, the evolutions of the
current squadron structures are researched to acquire an
understanding of the HS and HSL community goals (missions),
their operating environments, the technology they utilize,
and the work force available to them.
It can be argued that services provided by the HS and HSL
organizations are the missions they fulfill. It is important
to understand these missions. In short, structures are
designed and redesigned so as to best accomplish their
organizational goals under prevailing conditions (Connor,
1984, pp.9). Chapter III outlines the missions of the HS and
HSL communities to provide insight into the purpose of the
squadrons. Only after studying the purpose of organizations
can we consider and react to the constraints of environment,
technology, and work force (Connor, 1984, pp.8).
The world outside the organization with which it comes
into operating contact is its environment and is as
important a factor influencing its design as the goals the
organization is pursuing. The ASW helicopter environment
consist of international political and social factors, the
budget climate, interest groups and tax payers, to name a
few. Organizational design has been discussed by many
authors in management and organization theory. These authors
have identified propositions supporting the idea that the
best organizational design is contingent on environmental
conditions (Takahashi, 1987, pp.iii). The environmental
conditions that surround the HS and HSL communities are
changing with the demise of the USSR and the shrinking
military budget and requires an adjustment in the current
naval structures. Conner insist if an organization is to
survive and prosper, it must respond to its environment
(1984, pp.12). Consolidation may be the proper response to
the environmental changes in the political and economic
conditions that shape the structural design of the two
communities
.
Organizational design literature covers many types of
structural designs. A review of the current HS and HSL
structures reveal that they utilize two different organi-
zational designs to achieve their missions. The HS community
employs the more classical management model of a hierarchial
structure where one boss at the top exercises the principle
of unity of command (Takahashi, 1987, pp.2). The unity of
command principle states that the one person at the top of
the organization is the single superior to all the members
of the organization. The CO of the HS squadron exercises the
principle of unity of command whether the squadron is
deployed or shore-based.
Although the HSL squadron structure appears to resemble
the HS hierarchial design it actually utilizes a matrix
structure. "Any organization that abandons the precept of
unity of command and employs a multiple command system is
considered to be a matrix organization" (Takahashi, 1987,
pp.2). The HSL community abandons the unity of command when
they deploy detachments that are operationally controlled by
the ship's CO and administratively controlled by the
squadron's CO. This matrix system was developed to solve the
operational problems caused by the irregularities of
detachment deployments. A necessary condition for a matrix
organization to be the preferred structural choice was
"uncertainty" (Takahashi, 1987, pp.2).
Any redesign must take all these design factors into
account to successfully restructure an organization. Chapter
III will review the missions, the environment, the tech-
nology and the structure and composition of the assigned
work force of the two communities. Building on this
foundation, Chapter IV addresses the consolidation issue and
proposes four alternative organizational designs to the
current two community system.
II. METHODOLOGY
This thesis examines the advantages and disadvantages
associated with consolidating the HS and HSL communities.
The primary source material comes from personal interviews
of the commanding officers ( CO ' s ) from these communities.
The helicopter and mission developments of each community
were researched to determine the goals (missions), environ-
ments, and technology that shaped the squadron operational
structures. The operational structures of the current squad-
rons were then examined to determine how they have been
designed to adapt to these organizational constraints. The
current squadron designs and organizational constraints that
shaped these commands provided a framework on which to
discuss the consolidation issue.
A. THE INTERVIEWS
To determine if a consensus on the consolidation question
existed an attempt was made to interview all the CO ' s of the
East and West Coast HS and HSL squadrons, 19 of the 21
commanding officers were interviewed, two squadrons were
deployed and unavailable. The CO ' s were choosen because
their experiences qualified them as subject matter experts.
The CO ' s were sent a letter (see Appendix A) prior to the
interview to introduce the subject areas that would be
covered. All the interviews were intended to be face-to-face
7
but due to budget restrictions, the interviews of the East
Coast CO ' s were conducted over the telephone.
Question development and strategy during the interviews
were general in nature (see Appendix B for actual interview
questions) and concentrated on three main areas; first,
should the two communities be consolidated? Second, what
should the "new" consolidated squadron look like? And,
thirdly, what are the alternatives to consolidation?
Additionally, the CO ' s were asked what they thought were the
advantages and disadvantages associated with consolidation
and what were the advantages and disadvantages to their
proposed alternative structure. The helicopter community's
Vision 2005 brief was also obtained to ensure every
advantage and disadvantage was recorded.
All face-to-face interviews were taped and transcribed.
The telephone interviews were hand recorded during the
interview. All the advantages, disadvantages, and proposed
new structures presented in this thesis were taken from the
CO's responses and from the Vision 2005 brief. Corroborative
data was researched to support all CO's responses and was
included with the responses. In situations where a response
was seen as an advantage by one CO and a disadvantage by
another, the response was listed as both along with any
supporting comments.
B. BIAS
The data from the interviews can be characterized as
biased favoring each CO ' s community. The CO's were familiar
with how their community operated and was organized. They
were confident in analyzing their community's strengths and
weaknesses and uncertain about the other community.
Additionally, they were inclined to protect their community
from being "invaded" by the other community.
A general bias was evident in the CO's responses, most
HS CO's supported consolidation while HSL CO's felt it was a
bad idea for the communities. This response bias does not
invalidate this thesis because the advantages and disad-
vantages of consolidation, as well as the proposed new
structures given by a CO, were still applicable regardless
of his particular views. The interview requested from the
CO's their perceptions based on their experiences and was
conscious of the inherent bias. Additionally, every effort
to support a perceived advantage or disadvantage with some
kind of corroborative data was attempted. Even if supporting
data was not available, the response was still used for the
thesis
.
The writer of this thesis also acknowledges the potential
of a personal bias to the HS community. This bias stems from
a HS background which includes a fleet tour of duty as the
squadron's ASW Officer and one tour of duty as an instructor
pilot in the HS FRS . This bias was seen as potentially a
greater problem to the thesis then the CO generated bias.
The interview questions were general and open ended to limit
any adverse effect this writer may have had on the CO '
s
responses. In an attempt to neutralize the writer's bias,
all responses were viewed as "truths" and presented in the
thesis
.
The summary and recommendations chapter had the greatest
potential to be effected by the writer's bias. While the
writer made every attempt to present the final conclusions
free from any preconceived ideas and based entirely on the
contents of the thesis the reader should keep the writer's
past HS experience in mind.
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT SQUADRON STRUCTURES
A. HELICOPTER AND MISSION DEVELOPMENT
1. HSL COMMUNITY
UH-2 Seasprite : In 1956 the US Navy required a high
speed utility helicopter that could operate off small
surface ships to provide liaison and rescue missions over
long distances. This helicopter requirement was filled by
the Kaman Corporation which designed the K-20, later
designated the UH-2 Seasprite by the US Navy. Initial
deliveries of the UH-2 began entering the fleet in late
1962. (ap Rees, 1986, pp.85) The UH-2 had a crew of three,
two pilots and one aircrewman. Because of its requirement
for small surface ship operation it had to be small enough
to land and be hangared on board. These ships routinely
operated hundreds of miles from the aircraft carrier in an
area referred to as the outer zone of the carrier defense.
The Navy considered the aircraft carrier to be the
high value unit and placed it in the center of the battle
group. Surface combatants, normally, destroyers and
cruisers, are strategically placed around the carrier to
form an umbrella of protection against air, surface and
subsurface threats. This protection was divided into inner
and outer zones. The inner zone consisted of a region within
50 miles of the carrier and the outer zone extended from 50
11
miles and beyond. The outer zone protection was the
responsibility of the destroyers and cruisers of the battle
group. Long range weapon systems were designed to provide
protection for themselves and for the aircraft carrier.
The helicopters operating in the outer zone were
require to transit long distances to perform liaison and
logistic missions to the carrier and to the other surface
ships of the battle group. Additionally, ships operating in
the outer zone had to provide their own search and rescue
(SAR) capability. The UH-2 performed this mission in the
case of a man-over-board or any other accident at sea.
Liaison, logistic and SAR would remain the cornerstone of
the HSL missions throughout its development.
In 1963, to counter a growing submarine threat, the
Kaman Helicopter Corporation received a US Navy contract to
investigate the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) potential of
the UH-2 Seasprite. If the ASW trials proved successful, the
Seasprite would replace the Gyrodyne ASW remote piloted
helicopter currently in service. Several ASW configurations
were evaluated, some included a dipping sonar system, but
ultimately a package that included a surface search radar, a
magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) system, and a sonobuoy
system, in addition to two externally mounted torpedoes for
submarine attack, was chosen, (ap Rees, 1986, pp.86)
This ASW configuration was influence by the defensive
needs of the helicopter's parent ship. The ASW remote
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piloted helicopter main mission was to fly out a specific
bearing from its control ship to a certain distance and drop
a torpedo in an area where an enemy sub was suspected to be.
The ASW version of the Seasprite would be required to
perform this same mission, only in a more advanced and more
accurate manner
.
The helicopter would be launched based on the ship's
ASW sensors, to an area where an enemy sub was suspected to
be. The helicopter would deploy a sonobuoy pattern to try to
localize the submarine. Once the threat was localized, the
MAD system would be utilized to confirm the subs presence
and pin point the optimum location of the torpedo drop.
The surface search radar was desired by the surface
ships because of its potential to extend the ship's radar
coverage range. Radar is limited by line-of-sight and by
placing a radar on an elevated platform, a helicopter, the
search area is significantly increased to an over-the-
horizon capability. This extended radar range greatly
increases the protective umbrella afforded the parent ship
from surface threats. The Seasprite helicopter enhanced and
became an integral part of the ship's weapon system.
This integration of the ASW and radar systems became
identified as LAMPS MK I (Light Airborne Multi-Purpose
System). The LAMPS MK I main objective was to give the Navy
its first small ship ASW helicopter that would serve as an
extension to the parent ship's ASW and radar search
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capabilities. ( ap Rees, 1986, pp.86) The ASW trials program
proved successful and the operational deployment of the new
Seasprite ASW variant, designated the SH-2D, began in
December 1971.
SH-60B Seahawk : The LAMPS program was a long range
project to resolve a deficiency in the surface fleet's ASW
protection. With the success of the LAMPS MK I program, a
LAMPS MK II update was planned with mission improvements to
add to the capabilities of the UH-2D and extend the ship's
tactical ASW air range. In the early 1970 's, the Navy
realized the SH-2D Seasprite would be unable to fulfill the
planned mission improvements of the MK II program. The Navy
decided to issue a new set of ASW requirements that resulted
in a LAMPS MK III specification. ( ap Rees, 1986, 154) The
S-70L, later designated the SH-60B Seahawk, was submitted by
the Sikorsky Helicopter Corporation for the MK III contract
competition.
Sikorsky was authorized to construct five prototype
aircraft in 1977, and after being awarded the production
contract, built the first SH-60B for operational deployment
in 1984 (ap Rees, 1986, pp.156). The LAMPS MK III system
further integrated the ship and helicopter capabilities,
upgrading anti-ship surveillance and targeting (ASST) to a
primary mission area. The integration of ship and air
capabilities has been a very successful feature of the LAMPS
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program and virtually makes the SH-60B and its base ship
inseparable
.
The Navy plans to continue the LAMPS program well
into the 21st century with the addition of the SH-60R in
1998. The Navy will outfit the SH-60R with an active dipping
sonar in an acknowledgement of the ASW threat the newer and
significantly quieter nuclear and diesel submarines poses to
its ships. For the first time the Navy will have an ASW
helicopter capable of doing all the missions associated with
inner and outer zone defense.
2. HS COMMUNITY
HSS-1 Seabat : The development of helicopter ASW
operations during the early 1950 's was impeded by the
relative poor engine power of the helicopters in operation
at the time. This lack of power prevented any realistic long
distant flight with a full complement of ASW sensors and
weaponry and virtually excluded operating in a hover over
water. The Sikorsky helicopters of the early 1950 's that
operated off aircraft carriers, designated HRS-1,2 or 3,
provided logistics and SAR for the carrier. Early trials
using these Sikorsky helicopters in an ASW role quickly
revealed the need for a larger and more powerful aircraft
and resulted in the Navy requesting a new helicopter from
the helicopter industry in 1952. (ap Rees, 1986, pp.132)
Sikorsky met this requirement with a "stretched" HRS
variant featuring a new powerplant and rotor configuration.
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By early 1955, the first shipment of the newly designated
HSS-1 Seabat began arriving to the fleet to serve in an ASW
role. The Seabat carried a crew of four, two pilots and two
aircrewmen. The ASW system contained two homing torpedoes
and the necessary ASW avionics for the dipping sonar system.
Later versions added automatic stabilization, auto-hover
capability, and other equipment that enabled the helicopter
to be flown in any weather day or night. The powerplant of
the Seabat was new but the real advances were in the ASW
systems. (ap Rees, 1986, pp.133)
These helicopters operated from aircraft carriers in
the center of the battle group and were the carriers last
line of defense against the subsurface threat. The aircraft
carrier generates a lot of acoustic noise as it moves
through the water thereby making passive sonobuoy detection
unreliable. Active dipping sonar is the preferred sensor for
prosecuting submarines in the inner zone. To perform dipping
operations in all weather conditions, day or night, an auto-
hover capability was required to safely maintain a stable
hover 50 feet above the ocean.
SH-3 Sea King : The advent of the first turbo-shaft
engines for helicopter use in the mid-1950' s revolutionized
the design and operation of helicopters in the ASW role. The
turbo-shaft driven engine was the answer to the Navy's
requirement for a helicopter capable of carrying a dipping
sonar, two homing torpedoes, sufficient fuel for four hours
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of flight endurance and full day or night all weather
avionics. (ap Rees, 1986, pp.134)
Sikorsky utilized turbo-shaft engines in its newly
designed S-61, later called the SH-3A Sea King by the Navy,
and received a development contract in the late 1957. The
Sea King's main outward feature consisted of a boat hull
undercarriage and two outrigger sponsons which enabled a
limited amphibious capability. Additionally, the Sea King
borrowed much of the ASW systems contained in the Seabat
which allowed the initial deliveries of the Sea King to
begin in 1961. ( ap Rees, 1986, pp.134) In contrast to the
SH-2 Seasprite which integrated into the ship's weapon
system, the SH-3 was virtually independent of the aircraft
carrier's command and control. The carrier's main mission is
the projection of force by its fixed wing aircraft. The
carrier left its own protection up to the surface ships in
the outer zone and to the SH-3's for its inner zone ASW
protection
.
Sikorsky's production of the SH-3 ended in the early
1970 's, but conversion programs that upgraded early models
into the SH-3H version continued into the early 1980 ' s. This
configuration involved the installation of new ASW equipment
including MAD and an active/passive sonobuoy system. ( ap
Rees, 1986, pp.139)
SH-60F War Hawk : In March 1985 the Navy authorized
full scale development of an H-60 variant that would utilize
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the basic airframe of the SH-60B but would contain a unique
avionics package. The SH-60F would be the replacement for
the Sea King and was designed to operate from aircraft
carriers. The SH-60F would utilize a dipping sonar system
and a sonobuoy system to defend the inner zone region, (ap
Rees, 1986, pp.156) Additionally, it would fulfill the SAR
mission during carrier fixed-wing operations. The SH-60F
began its fleet introduction in 1989 and is projected to
perform the HS missions into the 21st century.
Addressing the need for a survivable combat search
and rescue (CSAR) vehicle, the Navy purchased another
variant of the H-60, the HH-60H. During the Vietnam War,
SH-3's were sent over land in attempts to rescue of downed
aviators, many of these attempts were unsuccessful. The SH-3
was not built for this combat mission nor were the aircrews
properly trained for it. The HH-60H is a helicopter designed
specifically for the CSAR mission and began operation in
1990.
Based on a perceived reduction in the open ocean
submarine threat to the carrier and budget driven priorities
to reduce aircraft and personnel on board the carriers, the
Navy is discussing the option of removing the SH-60F's off
the carrier. Carrier ASW protection would be provided from a
HSL detachment on the carrier or from an accompanying
surface ship. The HH-60H's will provide logistic and CSAR
missions from the carrier, as well as, the growing need for
18
protection against the low, slow flyer and fast attack
gunboat threat.




As stated earlier, the design of a squadron, or any
organization, is dependent upon the environment it operates
in, the technology it utilizes, and the work force available
to it. These constraints and the purpose, or missions of the
squadron influence how it is organized. The environment that
the two communities operate in are similar, they both must
respond to changing external factors. The technology they
utilize are comparable and will eventually converge when the
SH-60R replaces both the SH-60B and SH-60F. And the work
force is drawn from the same general population and it can
be argued, is identical for both communities. Yet the HS and
HSL squadrons are designed quite differently to perform
their missions. This section will examine the squadron
structures in an effort to determine the cause for their
design differences.
2. HSL SQUADRON
Organizational Structure : Most HSL squadrons employ
the standard hierarchial organizational structure of all
Naval Aviation Squadrons, (see Figures 1 a & b), but
actually operate as a matrix organization in which personnel
are transferred between departments and detachments to meet




EXECUTIVE DEPT (2 OFFICERS, 15 ENLISTED)
SPECIAL ASST TO THE CO
(INFO XO)
SPECIAL ASST TO THE XO
DEPARTMENT HEAD ORGANIZATION
ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE TRAINING SAFETY
SAFETY DEPT (2 OFFICERS, 2 ENLISTED)
SAFETY OFFICER
NATOPS
AIRCREW NATOPS SAFETY PO
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPT (1 OFFICER, 14 ENLISTED)
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
PERSONNEL LEGAL EDUCATIONAL PUBLIC FIRST CMS
SERVICES AFFAIRS LIEUTENANT
Figure la: HSL Squadron Organization (Shore-Based)
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MISSION COMMUNICATIONS FLIGHT AIRCREW
READINESS DIVISION
SCHEDULES NAV
MAINTENANCE DEPT (3 OFFICERS, 24 ENLISTED)
MAINTENANCE OFFICER
ASSISTANT MAINTENANCE
MAINTENANCE ADMIN QUALITY ASSURANCE MATERIAL CONTROL
LINE DIVISION AIRCRAFT DIVISION AVIONICS DIVISION
TRAINING DEPT (1 OFFICER, 1 ENLISTED)
TRAINING OFFICER
TRAINING PO
Figure lb: HSL Squadron Organization (Shore-based
21
Current HSL squadrons maintain both shore based (non-
deployable) and sea duty (deployable) personnel. The sea
duty personnel will transfer in and out of the squadron
billets dependinq on their detachment schedule. This
required transferrinq will decrease the squadron's stability
to some extent. Many critical or primary billets are filled
by sea duty personnel whose position must be filled in for,
or replaced entirely, while they are deployed.
A typical HSL squadron is made up of 244 individuals,
50 officers and 194 enlisted. Sixty are permanently shore-
based and concentrate primarily on administrative functions
for the squadron and assisting the detachments. The
Commanding and Executive Officers remain on shore to
administer and supervise the activities of the squadron and
the deployed detachments. Most officers will be assigned two
to three different billets during their tour of duty in most
aviation squadrons.
The mission of this squadron is to provide either
single of dual helicopter detachments to deploy aboard
destroyers and cruisers. Each deployed detachment is
operationally controlled by the detachment's officers-in-
charge (OIC). The squadron retains administrative control of
the deployed units. Each detachment is made up of 15
individuals (see Figure 2), of the four officers, one is
designated the OIC. The OIC is normally a Lieutenant
Commander and is the most senior member of the detachment.
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HSL (SEA COMPONENT) BILLET AND PERSONNEL SUMMARY
BILLET TITLE RATING
Of f icer-In-Charge 0-4, Pilot
Maintenance Officer 0-3, Pilot
Operations Officer 0-2, Pilot
Administration Officer 0-2, Pilot
Maintenance Control ADC
Powerplant Maintenance AD2, AD3
Electric Inst Maintenance AE2, AE3




Figure 2: HSL Detachment Billet and Personnel Summary
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The OIC works with the parent's ship Commanding Officer in
determining the daily operational responsibilities of the
helicopter. Each squadron is capable of deploying up to ten
independent detachments with three of those detachments
having two aircraft.
Today there are 11 HSL squadrons in operation, five
on the East, five on the West Coast and one permanently
stationed in Japan. One of the five squadrons on each coast
is a Fleet Replacement Squadron ( FRS ) responsible training
pilots, aircrew and maintenance personnel for the fleet
squadrons. Each squadron maintains thirteen aircraft. Six
months prior to a detachment deploying, personnel will be
formed into a detachment and will be assigned an aircraft.
Once formed, that detachment is responsible for that
aircraft's maintenance. After the deployment, the detachment
will formally stand down and be absorbed into the squadron.
3. HS SQUADRON
Organizational Structure : HS squadrons employ the
traditional hierarchial squadron structure which also is
based on shipboard organization methodology (see Figures 2 a
& b). The entire squadron embarks on board the aircraft
carrier as one unit. This traditional structure allows the
squadron to maintain its unity of command while on shore or
at sea. Since the entire squadron deploys as a unit, only
sea duty personnel are assigned. The Executive Officer and
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Figure 3a: HS Squadron Organization
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26
Commanding Officer by rotating sguadron personnel in and out
of assigned billets. Officers can expect to perform two to
three different billets during their tour of duty.
A typical HS squadron is made up of 203 individuals,
27 of which will be officers. The Commanding Officer deploys
with the squadron and maintains administrative and
operational control of the squadron. One or two plane
detachments can be conducted but these detachments are
usually short in duration. Today there are 13 HS squadrons
in operation, six on the East Coast, six on the West Coast
and one permanently stationed in Japan. One squadron on each
coast acts as the Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS)
responsible for training pilots, aircrew, and maintenance
personnel for the fleet squadrons. These two squadrons do
not deploy and are permanently shore based. There is an
additional squadron stationed in Japan and it is rotated
into the deployment schedule of the West Coast squadrons.
C . SUMMARY
This chapter looked at the development of the HS and HSL
helicopter communities. The HSL community started with three
missions performed by the UH-2 Seasprite while operating off
the destroyers and cruisers of the battle group and is
currently flying the SH-60B and performing a variety of mis-
sions. The SH-60R is the communities aircraft of the future
and with it will come additional missions to perform.
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The HS community started with the HSS-1 Seabat and three
missions and is currently flying two models of the SH-60
doing a variety of missions from the flight decks of the
fleet's aircraft carriers.
The HSL and HS organizational structures were also
compared to determine the cause for their design
differences. Deployment requirements influence the
organizational structure, HSL utilizes a matrix format to
provide single or two plane detachments to the battle group.
HSL maintains a shore-based executive branch to support the
squadron's deployed detachments while HS employs the




The previous chapter discussed how HS and HSL evolved as
separate communities. Their individual developments have
brought them to a juncture where a consolidation is
possible. There are several forces that are pushing these
two helicopter communities towards consolidation. Probably
the number one reason to address this issue is the economic
pressure to do more with less. The declining military budget
is prompting major reductions in manpower and hardware
resources. Aircraft procurement is being decreased from
initial buys, in fact, the Navy recently reduced its planned
total purchase of SH-60F's to 82 and SH-60B's to 181, down
from the original planned 92 and 205 respectively. Many
people are questioning whether naval aviation can afford the
luxury of maintaining two separate and distinct infra-
structures to support the HS and HSL helicopter communities.
Because of the economic squeeze, there is a search for a
better way of doing business.
The second force that seems to be pushing the communities
towards consolidation is the development of their
helicopters. After 40 years, HS and HSL are flying similar
aircraft with the possibility both communities will fly the
SH-60R in the future. With the arrival of the SH-60R will
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(FRS's). A natural progression in this evolution may be the
uniting of both these helicopter communities into one multi-
mission squadron.
There are political and operational forces opposing a
consolidation that will have to be overcome before the two
communities can be combined into one. While HS and HSL are
flying similar helicopters their missions have become more
dissimilar. The end of the Cold War resulted in a decrease
in the Soviet submarine threat and ASW lost much of its
prominence and now shares the spotlight with ASST, CSAR, and
ASUW missions. HSL has aggressively promoted its capability
for ASST but has shown less interest in the CSAR mission. HS
has enthusiastically pursued the CSAR mission but has
ignored the ASST role. While the two communities' aircraft
became similar, the utilization of that aircraft became more
diverse
.
These two communities contrast significantly in how they
are structured to handle deployments. HS deploys as a single
unit while HSL sends independent detachments. This
operational difference in "how they do business" promotes
the belief within their respective communities that they
should continue to remain separate. This belief is further
nurtured by the parochialism which has developed over the
years within the communities.
If these two helicopter communities are to be united the
political, operational and other organizational differences
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will have to be overcome. If it can be proven the advantages
of uniting the communities is greater than the disadvantages
then the case for consolidation will have added weight. The
following sections of this thesis will examine these issues
and compare the advantages of consolidation against the
disadvantages. The facts bearing on both sides of consoli-
dation are based on the responses given by the commanding
officers (CO's) of the HS and HSL fleet squadrons during
their interviews. Each CO was asked, based on their past
experiences, whether they felt that the two missions and
communities should be consolidated and what are the
advantages or disadvantages to consolidating?
B. THE PROS AND CONS OF CONSOLIDATION
1 . Advantages
The following is a list of the most commonly cited
advantages for consolidation from the interviews of the HS
and HSL CO's:
Manpower Savings : It is difficult to determine the
total reduction in manpower that will be realized by
combining the two communities. Several factors influence the
final number of personnel who will be required to outfit the
consolidated squadron. Manpower requirements will vary
depending on the new structure's size and organizational
shape. If the new structure resembled a HS type structure
for example, then the 60 shore-based personnel of the
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current HSL squadrons would be eliminated and constitute a
manpower savings.
Additionally, the effects of consolidation are far
reaching and manpower savings will occur throughout the
support structures of the two communities. These infra-
structures provide the logistic and maintenance support, the
staff hierarchies, and the training commands of these
helicopter communities and will be reduced with consoli-
dation. As an example, the FRS for the HS community has
approximately 60 officers and 336 enlisted personnel in each
of its two training squadrons while the HSL FRS has 43 and
250 respectively. If the FRS ' s are consolidated then the
totals would be reduced to an estimated 68 officers and 381
enlisted per training squadron resulting in a 240 reduction
in manpower requirements .( Squires, 1994, pp.1)
Monetary Savings : The actual savings realized by
combining the two communities will also vary with the choice
of consolidated organizational structure. Any reduction in
manpower equates to long range monetary savings. As an
example, if the communities were combined and the shore-
based personnel of a single HSL squadron were eliminated,
the monetary savings would amount to approximately 1.2
million dollars per year in reduced salaries. (This savings
computation was estimated by totaling the yearly salaries of
all the shore-based personnel.) Since budgetary forces are
the biggest force pushing these two communities to unite
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then fiscal savings will play an important role in consoli-
dation.
Aircraft Commonality : Although the H-60 variants are
similar in appearance, specific common parts and equipment
on the aircraft is estimated to be in the range of 35
percent. The avionics vary greatly between models and cannot
be interchanged. With consolidation, the benefits gained in
both supply support and maintenance efforts will be realized
by flying similar aircraft within the same squadron.
Community Lessons Learned : Through consolidation, the
Navy has the potential to capitalize on the strengths of
both communities and become more effective. Each has
developed different methods of deploying and performing
their missions, and by combining the two, the best
operational elements of both can be maximized to increase
the efficiency of the helicopter community overall.
Command at Sea : Most of the CO ' s felt it was
important to keep some kind of helicopter command at sea.
The reasons varied from "providing a little adult
supervision" to keeping the opportunity for promotion to
carrier command open to the community. Most HS CO ' s felt
being at sea when "the war" started was advantageous in
evaluating the current environment and in making the right
operational decisions for the squadron.
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2. Disadvantages
Command Opportunity : All CO ' s acknowledged consoli-
dation will result in a reduction in command opportunities
as the number of squadrons are decreased. They also stated
that similar consolidations in other aviation communities
have eliminated their command opportunities and these
reductions are further magnified by the current budget
climate.
Mission Saturation : Some of the CO's felt the
disparity in mission areas would make it difficult to train
aircrews to be proficient in all areas. They felt an attempt
to do so would sacrifice "depth for breath" and overall war
fighting capability would suffer.
Political Influence : Some felt political influence of
the new organization would be lessened after consolidation,
in that, support for issues such as tactics, manpower and
material, to name a few, would now come from only one
sponsor
.
Span of Control : There were a number of CO's who
believed having one CO responsible for one large squadron
that sent detachments throughout a battle group would cause
problems in administrative and operation control . The CO on
a carrier could not provide the support for the detachment
operating independent of the battle group, at any rate, the
support would be less than the current HSL system.
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Surface Ship's Authority : The HSL CO ' s voiced an
uneasiness that consolidation would lessen the surface
ship's authority concerning helicopter's operation. Some
felt this would destroy the teamwork the HSL and surface
Navy have established and undermine the authority of the
surface ship's CO.
Community Identity : With consolidation comes the fear
that one community will lose its identity. Some CO ' s feared
the community specific lessons learned throughout the years
would be lost as a result.
These were the advantages and disadvantages cited
most often by the interviewed commanding officers in
reference to consolidation. Many of the advantages and
disadvantages were dependent on the structure of the
consolidated squadron. The next section will look at several
options of what this "new" squadron should look like and how
they will meet the mission and operational requirements of
the environment they will be asked to operate in.
C. ALTERNATIVE SQUADRON ORGANIZATIONS
1. Introduction
Organizational structures must be designed to fit the
environment in which they operate. Any consolidated squadron
would be required to perform all the missions currently
executed by the HSL and HS communities. The new structure
would have to be versatile enough to cover the entire
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spectrum of these missions plus new missions currently being
added to the helicopter communities.
The following alternative squadron organizations are
structures suggested during the interviews with the current
CO's of the HSL and HS squadrons from both coasts. These
structures are all capable of performing the current
missions and flexible enough to absorb the new missions of
the future. These structures have advantages and disad-
vantages associated with each and they will be discussed in
Chapter V.
2. HSL PROTOTYPE STRUCTURE
When asked what the consolidated squadron should look
like most of the HSL CO's proposed a HSL type squadron
structure. Most HSL CO's felt consolidation was not a good
idea, but if consolidation was to occur, then their 's was
the preferred structure. In this configuration all the
different variants of H-60's would have their own squadron
organization, currently there are three variants operating
in the fleet, the SH-60B, SH-60F and HH-60H. These three
organizations would be modeled like the current HSL
structure. The CO and XO would remain shore-based and
detachments would be stand up for deployment to all the
ships in the battle group. The mix of helicopters deployed
from this prototype would depend on the battle group
commander's assessment of anticipated threats and the
helicopter requirements needed to meet these threats.
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When the SH-60R begins entering the fleet in 1998 and
eventually replaces both the SH-60B and SH-60F, then the
number of HSL type organizations would be reduced. Addition-
ally, if the HC community, which supplies logistic support
to the battle group, purchases a H-60 variant to replace the
aging H-46 then another HSL type organization would be
added.
This HSL prototype structure would not be so much a
consolidation of squadrons but more a different method of
deploying. The HS method of deploying entire squadrons would
disappear and all Battle Group requirements supplied by
detachments. Detachments stand up and work with their
assigned ships throughout work ups and the deployment and
then return to their mother squadron after deployment. This
structure has many advantages and some disadvantages and
these will be highlighted in the next chapter.
3 . HS Prototype Structure
When asked what the consolidated squadron should look
like every HS CO proposed a HS type structure. Almost every
HS CO felt consolidation should be accomplished and if the
communities were combined they should form one large
squadron of 12 to 16 aircraft and deploy as a entire unit.
From this unit the detachments would stand up and detach to
the surface ships throughout the battle group. The different
types of H-60's would be contained in this one squadron with
every pilot qualified to fly each type. This large squadron
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would employ the traditional squadron structure similar to
the current HS squadrons and the CO and XO would deploy with
their squadrons on board the aircraft carriers. Flexibility
to chanqe operationally would be accomplished by cross
decking the aircraft to ensure the assets met the threat.
SH-60B's could be replaced with SH-60F's if the ships were
transiting an area were sonar dipping was required.
When the SH-60R enters the fleet and eventually
replaces both the SH-60B and SH-60F then the number of H-60
variants per squadron would be reduced from three to two. If
the HC community purchases a H-60 variant then the issue of
whether they should be consolidated into this large HS type
squadron would be addressed at that time.
The HS prototype structure would be a true consoli-
dation of squadrons and missions. The HSL squadrons and
deploying method would be combined into the HS squadrons and
method of deploying. The main squadron structure would
deploy on board the carrier and detachments would be stood
up to work with the surface ships through work ups and
deployment. The aircraft "mix" could be adjusted to meet any
operational requirement the situation dictates. Specific
advantages and disadvantages will be discussed later.
Modified HS prototype : A modified version of the HS
type structure was recommended by three of the HS CO's. The
center piece of this structure would be an HS type
organization that contained the absolute minimum number of
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aircraft and personnel to handle the helicopter requirements
for a deployment. As an example, if the majority of the
battle group deployments required 12 helicopters to meet
operational commitments while an occasional required 16, the
base squadron would contain 12 helicopters. This unit would
always exist and forms the basic squadron. It would contain
the executive department and a core element of all the other
departments that make up the traditional squadron structure.
To supplement this core unit, either the FRS ' s would
have a portion of the squadron dedicated for sea going
detachments or the requirements would be filled by small HSL
squadrons. If a battle group commander wanted more assets
for a deployment this additional requirement would be manned
from the sea side of the FRS squadrons or the HSL squadrons.
The personnel transferred would be under the operational
control of the CO of the deployed squadron. They would be
assigned to the core squadron for the work up period and
remain in the squadron for the entire deployment. After the
deployment they would be returned to the FRS ' s and resume
their instructor duties or be transferred back to their
original squadrons .
The core squadron would be assigned a minimum number
of each type of H-60 to meet the requirements of an average
deployment. The Battle Group Commander could request from
the Type Wing Commander additional aircraft and personnel to
meet anticipated needs for deployment. The Type Wing
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Commander would assign the additional personnel and aircraft
to the core squadron.
This structure would consolidate the strengths of
both the HS and HSL communities. The squadron would deploy
as a unit with detachments sent to the destroyers and
cruisers of the battle group. The squadron's command
structure would be at sea to coordinate the helicopter
effort. The squadron size and make up would be flexible
enough to change with the anticipated operating environment
before the deployment and, once deployed, could be adjusted
by moving the helicopters around the battle group to meet
new requirements that develop.
4. Hybrid Structure
A combination of the HS and HSL type squadron
structures was proposed by a few of the CO ' s . This structure
would start with three HSL type organization, like the
structures proposed earlier, with each H-60 variant having
its own squadron organization. Each aircrew would be
qualified in the model aircraft of their parent squadron and
be responsible for the missions associated with that model
aircraft. From the three HSL type organization detachments
would be sent to stand up a HS type squadron large enough to
supply all the helicopters for the entire battle group. Like
the HS prototype structure, this squadron would deploy on
the carrier and send detachment to the destroyers and
cruiser of the battle group.
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This squadron would have a command structure like the
HS squadron and the CO and the executive branch would deploy
on board the aircraft carrier. The CO and XO of this
squadron would come from the CO ' s and XO ' s of the HSL type
organizations on a rotational basis. The squadron would
stand up six months prior to deployment. The mix aircraft
for the squadron would depend on the battle group
commander's assessment of the anticipated threats and the
helicopter types required to meet those threats. After the
deployment, the squadron would be dissolved and absorbed
back into the HSL type organizations.
D. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO
Most HSL squadron CO ' s stated that consolidation was not
necessary and that the status quo should be maintained. They
believed the helicopter deployment system was not broke so
they asked "why fix it?" They felt the budget should not be
the driving force for consolidation. If the communities had
to make a change then they should re-structure internally
and not consolidate in response to the external changes. As
one CO said, "If you ignore all the political garbage and
look at what is smart for everybody concerned, to command
opportunity, to being able to do lots of missions well, you
don't combine yourself into one big squadron."
Maintaining the status quo was virtually a unanimous
choice among the CO ' s as the alternative to consolidating.
Most acknowledged that by maintaining the status quo, the HS
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squadron's ASW mission would be lost, or at least it would
disappear soon after the arrival of the SH-60R. This belief
was based on the current trend to remove the SH-60F from the
carrier. Removal of the SH-60F from the carrier would
require the HSL community to protect the carrier from the
inner zone subsurface threat. This protection would be
provided by a detachment of SH-60R helicopters assigned to
the aircraft carrier or from a escort ship with a SH-60R
detachment on board.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter addressed the issue of consolidating the HS
and HSL communities. The advantages and disadvantages of
consolidation were based on the responses given by the CO '
s
doing their interviews. The perceived advantages for
combining the communities were the potential manpower and
monetary savings, the benefits gained by utilizing aircraft
commonality, the shared lessons learned between the
communities, and the potential to keep a helicopter command
at sea.
The disadvantages associated with consolidation were
perceived to be a reduction in command opportunity, the fear
of mission saturation, loss of political influence, an
increased span of control, a decrease in the surface ship's
CO's authority, and a loss of community identity for one of
the current communities.
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Four alternative squadron organizations were proposed as
possible consolidated structures. These included a HSL
prototype structure, two HS prototype structures, and a
hybrid structure. These organizations were mentioned by the
CO's as possible replacements for the current two community
system. Additionally, the advantages and disadvantages of
maintaining the status quo were also examined.
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V. ALTERNATIVE SQUADRON ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter IV introduced four new squadron models capable of
performing within both the HS and HSL environments. These
squadrons can perform all the missions currently being
conducted by the communities and are flexible enough to add
future missions. In this chapter, the advantages and
disadvantages of each of these new organizations will be
analyzed. These advantages and disadvantages were identified
from the interviews of the squadron CO's.
B. HSL ORGANIZATION MODEL
1 . Advantages
A modification of the current HSL command structure
was the first new organization introduced. In this model
each H-60 variant had a separate HSL command structure that
would send detachments to fill all the battle group
helicopter requirements. This model has the following
advantages:
Organizational Flexibility : The number of commands
can be increased or reduced to reflect the number of H-60
variants operating in the fleet. Additionally, when the HC
community replaces the H-46 with a H-60 variant another
organization (much like the current HC squadrons) will be
formed. Should the SH-60R replace both the SH-60B and SH-60F
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in the future then the number of HSL organizations would be
reduced. The size of these commands will vary in personnel
and billet strengths based on the demand for each particular
H-60 model . Each HSL organization would find its own optimal
size to meet fleet reguirements
.
Operational Flexibility : Detachments stand up based
on reguirements provided by the battle group commander.
These reguirements are based on the world situation and
where the battle group is expected to operate. For an
example, if the battle group was scheduled to operate in the
open ocean and away from any subsurface threats then the
battle group commander may reguire fewer SH-60F's and more
SH-60B"s and HH-60H's. The mix of the H-60 variants
reguested would vary to meet the anticipated threat.
This organization is ideal for single plane
detachments supporting surface ships operating independent
of the battle group. In the last three year period over 60
percent of all HSL deployments were independent of the
battle group. Single detachments stand up from any one of
the sguadrons and deploy independently. Additionally,
supporting an amphibious ready group (ARG) from this model
is similar to supporting a battle group.
Reduced Infrastructure : Currently two infrastructures
are reguired to support the two separate communities. As
stated in Chapter III, if the battle group commitments were
handled entirely with detachments then the infrastructure
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would be structured to only support the detachment method of
deployment and result in savings in manpower and money.
Mission Specialization : Aircrew would only be
required to specialize in one type of aircraft. Each H-60
organization would only perform their specific missions. A
pilot flying a HH-60H would not be required to perform ASW
.
Mission specialization would limit the number of required
missions each aircrew was responsible for and prevent, as
one CO remarked, "sacrificing depth for breath."
2. Disadvantages
This model also has some disadvantages which are
highlighted below:
Command at Sea : If all battle group requirements are
supported by detachments then a squadron CO would be removed
from the carrier. Removing the CO causes several problems.
The OIC for the carrier detachment would be at a positional
disadvantage to the other squadron CO's when fighting for
berthing/squadron spaces, flight deck time, and many other
daily conflicts that arise on board an aircraft carrier.
Without a CO commanding a full squadron onboard the
carrier the relationship between the helicopter community
and the fixed wing community could be lessened. The helicop-
ters would cease to be a part of the air wing and be viewed
as support units. Additionally, without a helicopter CO
competing against the fixed wing CO's for fitness reports
the opportunity to command a carrier would be closed.
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Command of a carrier is seen as a required billet for
carrier based pilots to be competitive for promotion to Flag
rank.
Inflexibility Once Deployed : Once a detachment has
been assigned to a ship, the ship's CO exercises operational
control of that detachment. Each ship's CO uses their
helicopter asset for their own purposes and there is little
coordinated utilization of battle group helicopters.
FRS Consolidation : With each H-60 variant having its
own command structure and mission requirements there would
be little incentive to consolidate the FRS training
squadrons. Consolidating the H-60 FRS ' s "just wouldn't make
sense" for the same reasons argued against combining the
FRS ' s in the spring of 1993. Increased span of control,




Increased Manpower : This structure could potentially
increase the manpower required to support the battle group.
The HS structure would be replaced by two HSL type
organizations. Each of these would have a portion that was
strictly shore based. The switch to the HSL type structures
would most likely increase manpower requirements which is




The supervision, inflexibility, and coordination
disadvantages could be minimized by placing a post command
commander on the battle group commander's staff to function
as helicopter element control (HEC). This would place a
senior helicopter officer on the carrier to fight the daily
battles for the carrier helicopter detachment. The HEC would
also be responsible for supervising the helicopters of the
battle group and act as the point of contact for all
helicopter coordination and operations.
The FRS ' s could be consolidated and replacement
aircrew going through training would undergo a mission
specific flight syllabus oriented to their H-60 model. This
would require the FRS ' s to expand training to support
different mission requirements within the same broad
syllabus
.
Initially the increase in manpower may be a temporary
sacrifice for a more efficient use of H-60 helicopters. This
efficiency in how the helicopters are utilized may pay
enough dividends to reduce manpower requirements in the long
run when the HSL organizations finally find their optimum
size
.
C. HS ORGANIZATION MODELS
1 . Advantages
The second new model introduced is a modification of
the current HS structure with all H-60 variants being
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organized into HS squadrons which deploy an entire squadron
and sends detachments to fill the battle group requirements.
This model has the following advantages:
Command at Sea : For reasons stated earlier, keeping a
helicopter CO on the carrier is advantageous to the squadron
and the helicopter community. By deploying with the squadron
the CO would be able to interface with the carrier's battle
group staff. The staff would have available a helicopter
subject matter expert. The squadron CO would be a true HEC,
available to answer questions and coordinate all the heli-
copters of the battle group.
Having the CO at sea and controlling all the
helicopters will aid in integrating the community into the
air wing and result in an effective utilization of
helicopter assets. The CO ' s presence will influence the
behavior of the rest of the squadron and set the standards
in operating procedures. Additionally, the CO will have
control over the missions assigned to the squadron. Finally,
most CO ' s interviewed felt it important to keep a helicopter
command at sea to preserve the opportunity to command a
carrier
.
Flexibil ity (while deployed): Coordinated movement of
aircraft and crews around the battle group ensures the best
assets were positioned according to the operational threat
thereby increasing warfighting capability. Maintenance
advantages can be gained by positioning the aircraft
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requiring major maintenance on ships that best facilitate
the work being accomplished. Helicopters requiring phase
inspections can be swapped with an "up" aircraft until the
phase is completed. The carrier's supply and AIMD
departments would be available to support the detachments
with parts and intermediate maintenance.
FRS Consolidation : Unlike the HSL model, since every
pilot would be required to fly every type helicopter and be
responsible for all the missions then FRS consolidation
would be necessary to provide the proper initial training.
By consolidating the FRS's, savings in manpower and aircraft
assets would be realized. Each FRS consolidation would
result in an estimated reduction of 35 officers and 205
enlisted personnel and a reduction of 10 aircraft. (Squires,
1994, pp.1)
Aircraft Parts Commonality : If one squadron owned
all the H-60 variants the maintenance advantages presented
by the aircraft commonality can be realized. It is estimated
that 35 percent of the aircraft parts are common to all H-60
models, most of the differences are in the avionics systems.
This 35 percent offers a potential for significant savings
in parts inventory and maintenance effort not currently
being realized.
Reduced Infrastructure : Again, as in the HSL model,
the number of communities would be decreased resulting in a
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reduction in the infrastructure supporting helicopter
operations
.
Reduced Manpower Requirements : By eliminating the HSL
structure, with its shore side, the manpower requirement
would be reduced by 60 billets for each HSL squadron
eliminated. This reduction represents the personnel that
make up the shore side of the HSL squadron. Since the HS
squadron already has an executive and administrative staff
to support the squadron these individuals would be redundant
and their billets could be eliminated.
Additional manpower savings may be realized by
reducing the overall number of detachments required to fill
battle group requirements. Currently there are four HSL
squadrons on the East Coast capable of deploying 13
detachments and consisting of 244 squadron members.
Resulting in a total manpower requirement of roughly 1985
(970 HSL and 1015 HS ) . Consolidation to a 16 helicopter HS
format would increase each HS squadron by the manpower
required fill eight detachments, or about 120 individuals.
This would reduce the overall manpower requirement to
approximately 1625 (five squadrons times 323).
Reduced Helicopter Requirement : Consolidating to a HS
structure would reduce the current helicopter requirement.
On the West Coast (including the squadrons stationed in
Japan) there are six HS squadrons operating with eight
aircraft each and five HSL squadrons operating with 13
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aircraft per squadron for a total of 113. If consolidation
resulted in six HS squadrons operating with 16 aircraft per
squadron the total would be 96. On the West Coast alone,
consolidation would result in reducing helicopter
requirements by at least 17. The CO ' s interviewed estimated
16 helicopters were required to adequately support a battle
group.
2. Disadvantages
Organizational Inflexibility : This HS model is rigid
in its design. It is made up of a fixed number and type of
helicopters. It would be unable to change aircraft mix and
numbers to adjust to the battle group's requirements and
would deploy with all of its helicopters whether they were
required or not.
Without a permanent shore-based element, this model
is not suited to handle the single plane detachments. Over
60 percent of the HSL detachments in the last three years
have been independent and operated without the battle group.
This HS model would also have difficulty handling the ARG
deployment because fewer than 16 aircraft would be required
to support an ARG.
Span of Control : A squadron of this size and
operational shape may be too large for the command
structure. A squadron of 16 aircraft would consist of
approximately 400 individuals. Administering a squadron this
large may not be unmanageable. There are larger squadrons
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but they are not required to deploy on an aircraft carrier
with several detachments operating thousands of miles from
their base squadrons. Operational and logistic control of
this model may prove difficult.
Training Overload : Many CO ' s felt the missions were
too numerous and varied for an aircrew to become proficient
in all of them. FRS training would have to be extended to
expose an aircrew to the combined missions. Once in the
squadron, the number of missions would make keeping current
and proficient in all of them difficult. Even if currency is
maintained, the level of expertise may decline and, as one
CO stated, "the aircrews may become jacks of all trades and
masters of none."
Mission Specialization : To respond to the training
overload some CO ' s felt that mission specialization within
the squadron would result. A pilot would become mission
qualified in a specific mission area (CSAR, ASST) and would
fly only those missions. Most felt this specialization would
defeat one of the purposes for consolidating, achieving
operational flexibility, and also cause morale problems if
one mission area was seen as better than the others.
3. Assessment
The organizational design of this model may be
inflexible but this design is also one of its strengths.
Because the squadron deploys together and stays together
when it returns higher morale and retention results.
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Additionally, the command structure and squadron integrity
is maintained during deployments.
The question of what to do about single plane
detachments and ARG support poses a greater problem. These
requirements can be rotated among the HS squadrons so as not
to interfere with their deployment schedules. Another method
of handling these detachments would require setting up a HSL
type squadron to supply single helicopter detachments and
ARG requirements. This squadron would be in addition to the
squadrons responsible for battle group deployments. A third
method of handling these detachments is to configure the FRS
with a sea side when it undergoes its consolidation. This
sea side would be responsible for handling single aircraft
detachments
.
Almost all the HS CO ' s felt the increased span of
control would not be too difficult to manage with this
model. They felt this organization's span of control would
not be different from what is currently being done in the
HSL squadrons and once a detachment went over-the-horizon it
was basically independent of the squadron.
Initially the training overload could be reduced by
not requiring all pilots to be qualified in every mission
area and allowing the community to grow an overall
expertise. This may lead to a temporary situation of mission
specialization, however both communities viewed this as a
necessary evil until the corporate knowledge of both
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communities developed through the new organization. In
addition to allowing the knowledge to spread throughout the
community, first tour pilots should concentrate on one
mission area (carrier operations) for their first deployment
and focus on the other mission area (detachment operations)
for their second deployment.
4. Modified HS Organization Model
The second HS organization proposed in Chapter IV
would also solve some of the disadvantages of the first HS
type structure. Instead of having the maximum number of
aircraft to handle every situation a battle group may
encounter the core sguadron would be outfitted with the
minimum number of aircraft to handle normal battle group
requirements. This structure would provide more
predeployment flexibility with the sea side of the FRS or
small HSL squadron supplying additional aircraft and
personnel on an as needed basis and handle the single plane
detachments while the core squadrons would be responsible
for supporting the ARG deployments. Configuring the FRS with
a sea side may cause some problems but it is not
unprecedented, for example, HS-1 (the East Coast FRS) was
organized with a sea side that handled single aircraft
requirements
.
This modified HS type structure will reduce the span
of control and training overload problems. The basic core
squadrons would be smaller than the first new HS squadron
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model. Since these detachments would operate independently
of the squadron they would require only administrative
support. The personnel transferred from instructor pilot
billets at the FRS would be at a minimum on their second
tour and qualified in mission areas they would be assigned;
furthermore, with their expertise the number of pilots
requiring training in the core squadron would be manageable.
This modified HS version would have all the
advantages the larger HS squadrons had and may further
reduce manpower and aircraft requirements. The squadron
would only deploy with the personnel and aircraft assets
that were needed to fulfill the missions.
D. HYBRID ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL
1 . Advantages
The final organization proposed combined the HS and
HSL type squadron structures. This hybrid structure started
with the HSL type organizations that sent detachments to
form a HS type squadron. This structure has many of the
advantages of both HS and HSL type organizations, and some
are listed below:
Flexibility : This structure would have totally
flexibility. It could increase and decrease in size with the
number of H-60 models operating in the fleet. Internally,
each HSL organization would find its optimal size based on
demand. Operationally the squadron could be formed to the
battle group commander specifications and once deployed, the
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squadron assets could be freely positioned to meet the
anticipated threat. Finally, this structure could support
either the single plane detachments or the ARG's with little
difficulty.
Reduced Infrastructure : The infrastructure supporting
this hybrid organization could be reduced from the current
dual support systems to a single support system.
Command at Sea : With the CO deploying with the
squadron a helicopter command at sea would be maintained
along with all the advantages associated with having a CO at
sea.
Aircraft Commonality : Greater utilization of aircraft
commonality may be realized by the combined squadron than is
currently being employed.
2. Disadvantages
There are two major disadvantages to this structure
and they are:
FRS Consolidation : With each H-60 variant having its
own command structure and mission requirements there is
little incentive to consolidate the formal training
squadrons. The FRS ' s could be consolidated but the increased
span of control, the increased training time, and a
potential increase in key billets may make consolidation
unfeasible.
Increased Manpower : This structure could potentially
increase the manpower requirements over the requirement of
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the HSL alternative organization. Deploying a CO and an
executive department would increase the number of personnel.
E. STATUS QUO
1 . Advantages
The unanimous choice among all the CO ' s as an
alternative to consolidating was to maintain the status quo.
The current two community system has its advantages which
are highlighted below:
Command at Sea : The CO ' s authority would be limited
to the helicopter squadron embarked on the carrier but the
status quo would keep a helicopter CO at sea.
Proven Deployment Methods : HS and HSL have developed
over the last 40 years into the systems they are today. The
deployment methods have been tried and tested to be
effective in meeting battle group requirements. As several
CO ' s said, "The system is not broke so why fix it?"
Community Identity : The status quo will allow both
communities to exist. Consolidation would eliminate one of
the communities and, as some CO ' s feared, a loss of that
community's history and lessons learned.
Flexibility : The two methods of deploying provide the
needed flexibility to the battle group commander. The HS
deployment method provides the bulk of the helicopter
requirements and the HSL detachments supply the specific
helicopter needs. The detachments give the battle group
commander flexibility in selecting the helicopter mix.
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Mission Specialization : Each community has specific
missions they perform. Aircrew training is concentrated on
these missions to maintain their qualifications. Mission
specialization limits the number of required missions each
aircrew is responsible for and helps prevent mission
overload
.
Caution : Many CO ' s felt the political and operational
environments are changing to much to make such a drastic
move like consolidation. They felt it was safer to wait and
make the decision to consolidate when the SH-60R began
entering the fleet in 1998.
2. Disadvantages
There were no specific disadvantages to maintaining
the status quo. Some Co's felt if the helicopter community
did not come up with a viable alternative to respond to
today's budget pressure a decision would be made external to
the community. By not consolidating, some of the potential
advantages will not be realized but the disadvantages of
consolidation will also be avoided.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter focused on the advantages and disadvantages
of the four proposed alternative organizations and those
associated with maintaining the status quo. The HSL type
organization provided positive benefits in its flexibility,
both organizational and operational, in reducing the
infrastructure, and in mission specialization, the greatest
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benefit is the flexibility of this organization. Lost
command at sea, an inflexibility while deployed, difficulty
in consolidating the FRS's, and a possible increase in
manpower requirement were considered disadvantages with this
form of a consolidated structure. The lost of a command at
sea and the lack of manpower reduction pose the largest
foreseeable negative factor.
The HS organization models produced two types of
structures. First, one large HS squadron, scored advantages
in keeping a helicopter command at sea, in its flexibility
when deployed, FRS consolidation, utilization of aircraft
commonality, in reducing infrastructure, and in reducing
manpower and aircraft requirements. The reduction in the
manpower requirements is the most attractive benefit of this
structure. The disadvantages were its organizational
inflexibility, the increased span of control, the possible
training overload and the mission specialization that might
result. This organization's inability to handle single de-
tachments and changing requirements are the biggest limi-
tations of this model.
The second HS model was a modification of the first and
provided more organizational flexibility and built on the
advantages of the first model. The modified structure also
relieved some of the disadvantages caused by the increased
span of control and training overload. Neither HS model
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addressed the possibility of the HC community purchasing a
H-60 variant.
The last organization was a hybrid structure that had
advantages in its flexibility, in reducing infrastructure,
maintaining a command at sea, and realizing the benefits of
aircraft commonality. This model's organizational and
operational flexibility are its main attraction. The
disadvantages were few but unfortunately quite serious. It
would make consolidation of the FRS ' s difficult and may
actually increase the manpower required over the current two
community system.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has covered the development of the HS and HSL
communities. It has reviewed the current structures of the
squadrons that make up the two communities. The issue of
consolidation was addressed and four alternative organi-
zations were proposed. An analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages of these organizations was provided and the
merits of maintaining status quo were discussed. The
question is, "Where do we go from here?"
If you listen to half of the HS and HSL CO ' s and follow
the guidance of the "Vision 2005" brief then you stay with
the status quo and make adjustments to the current two
community system. An argument for this position can be made
under the current circumstances. The current structure is a
proven system that maintains the two communities'
identities. With the world and economic conditions
continuously changing it may be wiser to wait before making
any corrections to the current system. After all, as
suggested by several CO's, "if it ain't broke, why fix it?"
On the other hand, while "it" may not be broke, the
environmental conditions surrounding the two communities is
changing. How long can the current system fit it's internal
and external constraints if it does not adjust to these
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conditions? Persistent pressure to balance the budget and
rising health care costs are putting a squeeze on all
government- funded programs. The military has been asked
repeatedly to make further cuts in its budgets and this
trend will continue into the future. The decreasing defense
budget is driving many, if not all, of the decisions being
made in our military systems. Cost savings may be the
deciding factor that pushes the two communities to
consolidation
.
The defense budget is not the only environmental
constraint that is changing. The Navy is changing and must
respond to new challenges to national security. Open ocean
operations is being replaced by littoral warfare. The HS and
HSL missions are changing to support this warfare
orientation. Amphibious operations, air-to-air defense, and
anti-ship defense will play greater roles in the missions of
the two communities. The technology utilized by HS and HSL
continues to change. The SH-60R will increase the
capabilities of the ASW helicopters. Technological advances
will enable the helicopter aircrew to perform the new
missions associated with littoral warfare. And manpower
reductions are changing the work force available to the
communities. Fewer personnel are being asked to do more and
more missions and tasks. All these factors require an
adjustment by the current naval structures in order to
become both a capable and affordable warfighting force.
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The reality of the economic situation requires the HS and
HSL communities look to the future and plan accordingly. It
is most likely the two structures will be consolidated in
the future; powerful fiscal and technological forces are
driving them in that direction. The push for a balanced
budget will require many hard choices and the ASW helicopter
community's sacrifice may be the current two structure
system. The next decision to be made is what will this
consolidated structure look like?
Of the four proposed alternative structures, the modified
HS type organization with a core squadron supplemented by
small HSL squadrons offers the most promise in reducing
manpower requirements and still providing the warfighting
capabilities. This organization has the flexibility to meet
the operational commitments of the future and still provide
significant savings in manpower. It will be able to perform
all the missions with fewer aircraft and keep a helicopter
command at sea. It will enable a merging of the two
communities lessons learned, taking the best of both and
become a more effective fighting force. And perhaps best of
all, this system will produce aircrews who are more
knowledgeable about surface Navy operations. Currently, HS
or HSL is extensively knowledgeable in one mission area or
the other. Consolidation will generate pilots who have flown
under both operational conditions and produce uniquely
trained individuals.
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The perceived disadvantages to consolidation and to this
form of combined structure may result from fear of change.
Change causes anxiety from the people or organizations in
power because their position may be affected by the change.
Concerns of mission specialization, loss of political
influence, span of control, and loss of community identity
may be based more on anxiety than on facts. There are
aviation communities that perform many missions (F/A 18) and
are larger (P-3). More political power may result from the
two communities speaking as one. In this researcher's view
these disadvantages are not substantive enough to prevent
consolidation. They are obstacles that can be overcome.
Additionally, if an attempt to consolidate the two
communities failed, the communities can always be separated
again.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1) The Navy form a Project Action Team to continue
studying the issues surrounding combining the KS and HSL
communities. This team will be made up from individuals from
both communities. The study will continue to focus on the
benefits associated with consolidation and on possible
alternative organizations, with particular attention paid to
manpower savings and warfighting capabilities.
2) Additionally, the team would plan the implementation
of the consolidation of the two communities. It is
recommended that a model similar to the current HS system be
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employed in the new organization. This will maximize the
reduction in manpower while preserving warfighting
capability. Any consolidation would be required to utilize
the lessons learned and personnel from both HS and HSL.
Consolidation planning should begin now so the
communities are ready to execute an effective course of
action when the economic conditions dictate a restructuring.
Failure to plan for this contingency may force the
consolidation decisions to come from outside the
communities. The author strongly feels HS and HSL must
consider themselves as one helicopter community. Only
through strength of unity will each protect the common
interest of both. It is time to replace individual community
views with a genuine desire, through consolidation, to do
what is best for the ASW community and the Navy as a whole.
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From: LCDR Raymond B. Roll, USN
To: Commanding Officer, HS-XX
Subj : Interviews to discuss consolidation issues
1
.
I am currently researching the advantages and
disadvantages associated with consolidating the HS and HSL
missions and would very much like to meet with you to obtain
your ideas on this subject. I am doing this research as part
of my thesis work for the Naval Postgraduate School. I plan
to be in San Diego during the week of Dec 20 - 24, 1993 to
do interviews with current and past Commanding Officers of
both HS and HSL squadrons. I will contact your office on
Monday (Dec 20) to schedule a specific time for a meeting
with you.
2. The following areas will be covered, as well as any other
related areas that develop during the interview;
-Should the two missions and/or squadrons be
consolidated?
-What are the advantages and disadvantages associated
with a consolidation?
-What should the "new" squadron organizational
structure look like?
-What are the barriers to implementing a change to the
current system?
3. If a face-to-face interview is not possible then a
perhaps a phone interview can be conducted at another time.
If you have any questions, I can be reached at or









1. Should the two communities be consolidated?
a) Why or why not?
b) Advantages to consolidating?
c) Disadvantages to consolidating?
2. Regardless of your response to question 1, if they were
consolidated, what should the "new" squadron organization
look like?
a) options?
b) Advantages or disadvantages of each?
c) Special issues;
- Controllability?




3. What are the barriers to implementing a change to the
current system?
What are the alternatives to consolidation?
Are there any other comments or suggestions concerning
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